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Abstract. Deep neural networks (DNNs) have achieved great successes
in various vision applications due to their strong expressive power. How-
ever, recent studies have shown that DNNs are vulnerable to adversarial
examples which are manipulated instances targeting to mislead DNNs to
make incorrect predictions. Currently, most such adversarial examples try
to guarantee “subtle perturbation” by limiting the Lp norm of the per-
turbation. In this paper, we propose SemanticAdv to generate a new type
of semantically realistic adversarial examples via attribute-conditioned
image editing. Compared to existing methods, our SemanticAdv enables
fine-grained analysis and evaluation of DNNs with input variations in
the attribute space. We conduct comprehensive experiments to show
that our adversarial examples not only exhibit semantically meaningful
appearances but also achieve high targeted attack success rates under
both whitebox and blackbox settings. Moreover, we show that the existing
pixel-based and attribute-based defense methods fail to defend against
SemanticAdv . We demonstrate the applicability of SemanticAdv on both
face recognition and general street-view images to show its generalization.
Such non-Lp bounded adversarial examples with controlled attribute ma-
nipulation can shed light on further understanding about vulnerabilities
of DNNs as well as novel defense approaches.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have demonstrated great successes in advancing the
state-of-the-art performance in various vision tasks [36,61,64,23,59,41,77,11] and
have been widely used in many safety-critical applications such as face verification
and autonomous driving [79]. At the same time, several studies [65,21,45,51,10,71,72,70]
have revealed the vulnerablity of DNNs against input variations. For example,
carefully crafted Lp bounded perturbations added to the pristine input images
can introduce arbitrary prediction errors during testing time. While being visually
imperceptible, Lp bounded adversarial attacks have certain limitations as they
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Fig. 1: Pipeline of SemanticAdv Left: Each row shows a pair of images differ in
only one semantic aspect. One of them is sampled from the ground-truth dataset,
while the other one is created by our conditional image generator, which is
adversary to the recognition model (e.g., face identification network and semantic
segmentation network). Right: Overview of the proposed attribute-conditioned
SemanticAdv against the face identity verification model
only capture the variations in the raw pixel space and cannot guarantee the
semantic realism for the generated instances. Recent works [72,30,69] have shown
the limitations of only measuring and evaluating the Lp bounded perturbation
(e.g., cannot handle variations in lighting conditions). Therefore, understanding
the failure modes of deep neural networks beyond raw pixel variations including
semantic perturbations requires further understanding and exploration.
In this work, we focus on studying how DNNs respond towards semantically
meaningful perturbations in the visual attribute space. In the visual recognition
literature, visual attributes [19,37,52] are properties observable in images that
have human-designated properties (e.g., black hair and blonde hair). As illustrated
in Figure 1 (left), given an input image with known attributes, we would like to
craft semantically meaningful (attribute-conditioned) adversarial examples via
image editing along a single attribute or a subset of attributes while keeping the
rest unchanged. Compared to traditional Lp bounded adversarial perturbations
or semantic perturbations on global color and texture [5], such attribute-based
image editing enables the users to conduct a fine-grained analysis and evaluation
of the DNN models through removing one or a set of visual aspects or adding
one object into the scene. We believe our attribute-conditioned image editing
is a natural way of introducing semantic perturbations, and it preserves clear
interpretability as: wearing a new pair of glasses or having the hair dyed with a
different color.
To facilitate the generation of semantic adversarial perturbations along a single
attribute dimension, we take advantage of the disentangled representation in deep
image generative models [55,31,6,75,12,3,76,28]. Such disentangled representation
SemanticAdv 3
allows us to explore the variations for a specific semantic factor while keeping the
other factors unchanged. As illustrated in Figure 1 (right), we first leverage an
attribute-conditioned image editing model [12] to construct a new instance which
is very similar to the source except one semantic aspect (the source image is
given as input). Given such pair of images, we synthesize the adversarial example
by interpolating between the pair of images in the feature-map space. As the
interpolation is constrained by the image pairs, the appearance of the resulting
semantic adversarial example resembles both of them.
To validate the effectiveness of our proposed SemanticAdv by attribute-
conditioned image editing, we consider two real-world tasks, including face
verification and landmark detection. We conduct both qualitative and quantita-
tive evaluations on CelebA dataset [40]. The results show that our SemanticAdv
not only achieves high targeted attack success rate and also preserves the se-
mantic meaning of the corresponding input images. To further demonstrate the
applicability of our SemanticAdv beyond face domain, we extend the framework
to generate adversarial street-view images. We treat semantic layouts as input
attributes and use the layout-conditioned image editing model [24] pre-trained
on Cityscape dataset [14]. Our results show that a well-trained semantic seg-
mentation model can be successfully attacked to neglect the pedestrian if we
insert another object by the side using our image editing model. In addition,
we show that existing adversarial training-based defense method is less effective
against our attack method, which motivates further defense strategies against
such semantic adversarial examples.
Our contributions are summarized as follows: (1) We propose a novel method
SemanticAdv to generate semantically meaningful adversarial examples via
attribute-conditioned image editing based on feature-space interpolation. Com-
pared to existing adversarial attacks, our method enables fine-grained attribute
analysis as well as further evaluation of vulnerabilities for DNN models. Such
semantic adversarial examples also provide explainable analysis for different
attributes in terms of their robustness and editing flexibility. (2) We conduct
extensive experiments and show that the proposed feature-space interpolation
strategy can generate high quality attribute-conditioned adversarial examples
more effectively than the simple attribute-space interpolation. Additionally, our
SemanticAdv exhibits high attack transferability as well as 67.7% query-free
black-box attack success rate on a real-world face verification platform. (3) We
empirically show that, compared to Lp attacks, the existing per-pixel based as
well as attribute-based defense methods fail to defend against our SemanticAdv ,
which indicates that such semantic adversarial examples identify certain unex-
plored vulnerable landscape of DNNs. (4) To demonstrate the applicability and
generalization of SemanticAdv beyond the face recognition domain, we extend
the framework to generate adversarial street-view images that fool semantic
segmentation models effectively.
2 Related Work
Semantic image editing. Semantic image synthesis and manipulation is a pop-
ular research topic in machine learning, graphics and vision. Thanks to recent
4 H. Qiu et al.
advances in deep generative models [34,20,50] and the empirical analysis of deep
classification networks [36,61,64], past few years have witnessed tremendous
breakthroughs towards high-fidelity pure image generation [55,31,6], attribute-
to-image generation [75,12], text-to-image generation [44,56,49,48,78,28], and
image-to-image translation [26,81,39,68,24].
Adversarial examples. Generating Lp bounded adversarial perturbation has been
extensively studied recently [65,21,45,51,10,71]. To further explore diverse adver-
sarial attacks and potentially help inspire defense mechanisms, it is important
to generate the so-called “unrestricted” adversarial examples which contain un-
restricted magnitude of perturbation while still preserve perceptual realism [7].
Recently, [72,18] propose to spatially transform the image patches instead of
adding pixel-wise perturbation, while such spatial transformation does not con-
sider semantic information. Our proposed semanticAdv focuses on generating
unrestricted perturbation with semantically meaningful patterns guided by visual
attributes.
Relevant to our work, [62] proposed to synthesize adversarial examples with
an unconditional generative model. [5] studied semantic transformation in only
the color or texture space. Compared to these works, semanticAdv is able to
generate adversarial examples in a controllable fashion using specific visual
attributes by performing manipulation in the feature space. We further analyze
the robustness of the recognition system by generating adversarial examples
guided by different visual attributes. Concurrent to our work, [29] proposed to
generate semantic-based attacks against a restricted binary classifier, while our
attack is able to mislead the model towards arbitrary adversarial targets. They
conduct the manipulation within the attribution space which is less flexible and
effective than our proposed feature-space interpolation.
3 SemanticAdv
3.1 Problem Definition
LetM be a machine learning model trained on a dataset D = {(x,y)} consisting
of image-label pairs, where x ∈ RH×W×DI and y ∈ RDL denote the image and
the ground-truth label, respectively. Here, H, W , DI , and DL denote the image
height, image width, number of image channels, and label dimensions, respectively.
For each image x, our model M makes a prediction yˆ =M(x) ∈ RDL . Given a
target image-label pair (xtgt,ytgt) and y 6= ytgt, a traditional attacker aims to
synthesize adversarial examples xadv by adding pixel-wise perturbations to or
spatially transforming the original image x such that M(xadv) = ytgt. In this
work, we consider a semantic attacker that generates semantically meaningful
perturbation via attribute-conditioned image editing with a conditional generative
model G. Compared to the traditional attacker, the proposed attack method
generates adversarial examples in a more controllable fashion by editing a single
semantic aspect through attribute-conditioned image editing.
3.2 Attribute-conditioned Image Editing
In order to produce semantically meaningful perturbations, we first introduce
how to synthesize attribute-conditioned images through interpolation.
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Semantic image editing. For simplicity, we start with the formulation where
the input attribute is represented as a compact vector. This formulation can be
directly extended to other input attribute formats including semantic layouts.
Let c ∈ RDC be an attribute representation reflecting the semantic factors (e.g.,
expression or hair color of a portrait image) of image x, where DC indicates
the attribute dimension and ci ∈ {0, 1} indicates the existence of i-th attribute.
We are interested in performing semantic image editing using the attribute-
conditioned image generator G. For example, given a portrait image of a girl with
black hair and the new attribute blonde hair, our generator is supposed to
synthesize a new image that turns the girl’s hair color from black to blonde while
keeping the rest of appearance unchanged. The synthesized image is denoted as
xnew = G(x, cnew) where cnew ∈ RDC is the new attribute. In the special case
when there is no attribute change (c = cnew), the generator simply reconstructs
the input: x′ = G(x, c) (ideally, we hope x′ equals to x). As our attribute
representation is disentangled and the change of attribute value is sufficiently
small (e.g., we only edit a single semantic attribute), our synthesized image xnew
is expected to be close to the data manifold [4,57,55]. In addition, we can generate
many similar images by linearly interpolating between the image pair x and xnew
in the attribute-space or the feature-space of the image-conditioned generator G,
which is supported by the previous work [75,55,3]
Attribute-space interpolation. Given a pair of attributes c and cnew, we introduce
an interpolation parameter α ∈ (0, 1) to generate the augmented attribute vector
c∗ ∈ RDC (see Eq. 1). Given augmented attribute c∗ and original image x, we
produce the image x* by the generator G through attribute-space interpolation.
x* = G(x, c*)
c* = α · c + (1− α) · cnew, where α ∈ [0, 1] (1)
Feature-map interpolation. Alternatively, we propose to interpolate using the
feature map produced by the generator G = Gdec ◦ Genc. Here, Genc is the encoder
module that takes the image as input and outputs the feature map. Similarly,
Gdec is the decoder module that takes the feature map as input and outputs the
synthesized image. Let f∗ = Genc(x, c) ∈ RHF×WF×CF be the feature map of an
intermediate layer in the generator, where HF , WF and CF indicate the height,
width, and number of channels in the feature map.
x* = Gdec(f*)
f* = β  Genc(x, c) + (1− β) Genc(x, cnew) (2)
Compared to the attribute-space interpolation which is parameterized by a
scalar α, we parameterize feature-map interpolation by a tensor β ∈ RHF×WF×CF
(βh,w,k ∈ [0, 1], where 1 ≤ h ≤ HF , 1 ≤ w ≤WF , and 1 ≤ k ≤ CF ) with the same
shape as the feature map. Compared to linear interpolation over attribute-space,
such design introduces more flexibility for adversarial attacks. Empirical results
in Section 4.2 show such design is critical to maintain both attack success and
good perceptual quality at the same time.
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3.3 Generating Semantically Meaningful Adversarial Examples
Existing work obtains the adversarial image xadv by adding perturbations or
transforming the input image x directly. In contrast, our semantic attack method
requires additional attribute-conditioned image generator G during the adversarial
image generation through interpolation. As we see in Eq. 3, the first term of our
objective function is the adversarial metric, the second term is a smoothness
constraint to guarantee the perceptual quality, and λ is used to control the balance
between the two terms. The adversarial metric is minimized once the model M
has been successfully attacked towards the target image-label pair (xtgt,ytgt). For
identify verification, ytgt is the identity representation of the target image; For
structured prediction tasks in our paper, ytgt either represents certain coordinates
(landmark detection) or semantic label maps (semantic segmentation).
xadv = argminx∗L(x∗)
L(x∗) = Ladv(x∗;M,ytgt) + λ · Lsmooth(x∗) (3)
Identity verification. In the identity verification task, two images are considered
to be the same identity if the corresponding identity embeddings from the
verification model M are reasonably close.
Ladv(x∗;M,ytgt) = max{κ, ΦidM(x∗,xtgt)} (4)
As we see in Eq. 4, ΦidM(·, ·) measures the distance between two identity
embeddings from the model M, where the normalized L2 distance is used in
our setting. In addition, we introduce the parameter κ representing the constant
related to the false positive rate (FPR) threshold computed from the development
set.
Structured prediction. For structured prediction tasks such as landmark detection
and semantic segmentation, we use Houdini objective proposed in [13] as our
adversarial metric and select the target landmark (semantic segmentation) target
as ytgt. As we see in the equation, ΦM(·, ·) is a scoring function for each image-
label pair and γ is the threshold. In addition, l(y∗,ytgt) is task loss decided by
the specific adversarial target, where y∗ =M(x∗).
Ladv(x∗;M,ytgt) =Pγ∼N (0,1)
[
ΦM(x∗,y∗)− ΦM(x∗,ytgt) < γ
]
· l(y∗,ytgt)
(5)
Interpolation smoothness Lsmooth. As the tensor to be interpolated in the feature-
map space has far more parameters compared to the attribute itself, we propose to
enforce a smoothness constraint on the tensor α used in feature-map interpolation.
As we see in Eq. 6, the smoothness loss encourages the interpolation tensors to
consist of piece-wise constant patches spatially, which has been widely used as a
pixel-wise de-noising objective for natural image processing [43,27].
Lsmooth(β) =
HF−1∑
h=1
WF∑
w=1
‖βh+1,w − βh,w‖22 +
HF∑
h=1
WF−1∑
w=1
‖βh,w+1 − βh,w‖22 (6)
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4 Experiments
In the experimental section, we mainly focus on analyzing the proposed Semanti-
cAdv in attacking state-of-the-art face recognition systems [63,59,80,67] due to its
wide applicability (e.g., identification for mobile payment) in the real world. We
attack both face verification and face landmark detection by generating attribute-
conditioned adversarial examples using annotations from CelebA dataset [40]. In
addition, we extend our attack to urban street scenes with semantic label maps
as the condition. We attack the semantic segmentation model DRN-D-22 [77]
previously trained on Cityscape [14] by generating adversarial examples with
dynamic objects manipulated (e.g., insert a car into the scene).
The experimental section is organized as follows. First, we analyze the quality
of generated adversarial examples and qualitatively compare our method with Lp
bounded pixel-wise optimization-based methods [10,16,73]. Second, we provide
both qualitative and quantitative results by controlling single semantic attribute.
In terms of attack transferability, we evaluate our proposed SemanticAdv in
various settings and further demonstrate the effectiveness of our method via
query-free black-box attacks against online face verification platforms. Third, we
compare our method with the baseline methods against different defense methods
on the face verification task. Fourth, we demonstrate that our SemanticAdv is a
general framework by showing the results in other tasks including face landmark
detection and street-view semantic segmentation.
4.1 Experimental Setup
Face identity verification. We select ResNet-50 and ResNet-101 [23] trained on
MS-Celeb-1M [22,15] as our face verification models. The models are trained
using two different objectives, namely, softmax loss [63,80] and cosine loss [67].
For simplicity, we use the notation “R-N-S” to indicate the model with N -
layer residual blocks as backbone trained using softmax loss, while “R-N-C”
indicates the same backbone trained using cosine loss. The distance between
face features is measured by normalized L2 distance. For R-101-S model, we
decide the parameter κ based on the false positive rate (FPR) for the identity
verification task. Four different FPRs have been used: 10−3 (with κ = 1.24),
3 × 10−4 (with κ = 1.05), 10−4 (with κ = 0.60), and < 10−4 (with κ = 0.30).
The distance metrics and selected thresholds are commonly used when evaluating
the performance of face recognition model [35,32]. Supplementary provides more
details on the performance of face recognition models and their corresponding
κ. To distinguish between the FPR we used in generating adversarial examples
and the other FPR used in evaluation, we introduce two notations “Generation
FPR (G-FPR)” and “Test FPR (T-FPR)”. For the experiment with query-free
black-box API attacks, we use two online face verification services provided by
Face++ [2] and AliYun [1].
Semantic attacks on face images. In our experiments, we randomly sample 1, 280
distinct identities form CelebA [40] and use the StarGAN [12] for attribute-
conditional image editing. In particular, we re-train our model on CelebA by
aligning the face landmarks and then resizing images to resolution 112× 112. We
8 H. Qiu et al.
select 17 identity-preserving attributes as our analysis, as such attributes mainly
reflect variations in facial expression and hair color.
In feature-map interpolation, to reduce the reconstruction error brought by
the generator (e.g., x 6= G(x, c)) in practice, we take one more step to obtain the
updated feature map f ′ = Genc(x′, c), where x′ = argminx′ ‖G(x′, c)− x‖.
For each distinct identity pair (x,xtgt), we perform semanticAdv guided by
each of the 17 attributes (e.g., we intentionally add or remove one specific attribute
while keeping the rest unchanged). In total, for each image x, we generate 17
adversarial images with different augmented attributes. In the experiments, we
select a commonly-used pixel-wise adversarial attack method [10] (referred as
CW) as our baseline. Compared to our proposed method, CW does not require
visual attributes as part of the system, as it only generates one adversarial
example for each instance. We refer the corresponding attack success rate as the
instance-wise success rate in which the attack success rate is calculated for each
instance. For each instance with 17 adversarial images using different augmented
attributes, if one of the 17 produced images can attack successfully, we count the
attack of this instance as one success, vice verse.
Face landmark detection. We select Face Alignment Network (FAN) [9] trained
on 300W-LP [82] and fine-tuned on 300-W [58] for 2D landmark detection. The
network is constructed by stacking Hour-Glass networks [47] with hierarchical
block [8]. Given a face image as input, FAN outputs 2D heatmaps which can be
subsequently leveraged to yield 68 2D landmarks.
Semantic attacks on street-view images. We select DRN-D-22 [77] as our semantic
segmentation model and fine-tune the model on image regions with resolution
256×256. To synthesize semantic adversarial perturbations, we consider semantic
label maps as the input attribute and leverage a generative image manipulation
model [24] pre-trained on CityScape [14] dataset. Given an input semantic
label map at resolution 256 × 256, we select a target object instance (e.g., a
pedestrian) to attack. Then, we create a manipulated semantic label map by
inserting another object instance (e.g., a car) in the vicinity of the target object.
Similar to the experiments in the face domain, for both semantic label maps, we
use the image manipulation encoder to extract features (with 1, 024 channels at
spatial resolution 16×16) and conduct feature-space interpolation. We synthesize
the final image by feeding the interpolated features to the image manipulation
decoder. By searching the interpolation coefficient that maximizes the attack
rate, we are able to fool the segmentation model with the synthesized final image.
4.2 SemanticAdv on Face Identity Verification
Attribute-space vs. feature-space interpolation. First, we qualitatively compare the
two interpolation methods and found that both attribute-space and feature-space
interpolation can generate reasonably looking samples (see Figure 2) through
interpolation (these are not adversarial examples). However, we found the two
interpolation methods perform differently when we optimize using the adver-
sarial objective (Eq. 3). We measure the attack success rate of attribute-space
interpolation (with G-FPR = T-FPR = 10−3): 0.08% on R-101-S, 0.31% on
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Attribute-space Interpolation Feature-space Interpolation
+mouth slightly open
Original image 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
+bangs
Original image 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Original image 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
-mouth slightly open
Original image 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
+bangs
Synthesized image by interpolation (with α) Synthesized image by interpolation (with α)
mouth slightly openmouth closed mouth slightly openmouth closed
without bangs without bangswith bangs with bangs
Fig. 2: Qualitative comparisons between attribute-space and feature-space in-
terpolation In our visualization, we set the interpolation parameter to be
0.0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1.0
Table 1: Attack success rate by selecting attribute or different layer’s feature-
map for interpolation on R-101-S(%) using G-FPR = T-FPR = 10−3. Here, fi
indicates the feature-map after i-th up-sampling operation. f−2 and f−1 are
the first and the second feature-maps after the last down-sampling operation,
respectively.
Interpolation / Attack Success (%)
Feature
Attribute
f−2 f−1 f0 f1 f2
xadv, G-FPR = 10−3 99.38 100.00 100.00 100.00 99.69 0.08
xadv, G-FPR = 10−4 59.53 98.44 99.45 97.58 73.52 0.00
R-101-C, and 0.16% on both R-50-S and R-50-C, which consistently fails to
attack the face verification model. Compared to attribute-space interpolation,
generating adversarial examples with feature-space interpolation produces much
better quantitative results (see Table 1). We conjecture that this is because the
high dimensional feature space can provide more manipulation freedom. This also
explains one potential reason of poor samples (e.g., blurry with many noticeable
artifacts) generated by the method proposed in [29]. We select f0, the last conv
layer before up-sampling layer in the generator for feature-space interpolation
due to its good performance.
Qualitative analysis. Figure 3 (top) shows the generated adversarial images
and corresponding perturbations against R-101-S of SemanticAdv and CW
respectively. The text below each figure is the name of an augmented attribute,
the sign before the name represents “adding” (in red) or “removing” (in blue)
the corresponding attribute from the original image. Figure 3 (bottom) shows
the adversarial examples with 17 augmented semantic attributes, respectively.
The attribute names are shown in the bottom. The first row contains images
generated by G(x, cnew) with an augmented attribute cnew and the second row
includes the corresponding adversarial images under feature-space interpolation.
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Source 
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Target
Image
+arched eyebrows
Adversarial Examples 
using CW
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Source 
Image
Target
Image
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Semantic Adversarial 
Examples
Adversarial Examples 
using CW
+bushy
eyebrows
-wavy 
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-young +eyeglasses -heavy
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+rosy
cheeks
+chubby -mouth
slightly open
+blonde 
hair
-wearing
lipstick
-smiling -arched
eyebrows
+bangs +wearing
earrings
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+receding
hairline
-pale 
skin
Synthesized image with 
augmented attribute (ɑ=0)
Adversarial image by 
optimizing interpolation 
parameter (ɑ=argminɑL(.))
+pale skin +receding hairline +heavy makeup
Source 
Image
Target
Image
Semantic Adversarial Examples Adversarial Examples 
using CW
+smiling -bags under eyes+arched eyebrows
+pale skin +heavy makeup +bags under eyes
-blonde hair +smiling+rosy cheeks
Source 
Image
Target
Image
Generation via attribute-conditioned image editing 
+bushy
eyebrows
+wavy 
hair
-young +eyeglasses -heavy
makeup
-rosy
cheeks
+chubby +mouth
slightly open
-blonde 
hair
-wearing
lipstick
-smiling -arched
eyebrows
+bangs -wearing
earrings
+bags
under eyes
+receding
hairline
Synthesized image with 
augmented attribute (β=0)
Adversarial image by 
optimizing interpolation 
parameter (β=argminβL(.))
+pale 
skin
Fig. 3: Top: Qualitative comparisons between our proposed SemanticAdv and
pixel-wise adversarial examples generated by CW [10]. Along with the adversarial
examples, we also provide the corresponding perturbations (residual) on the right.
Perturbations generated by our SemanticAdv (G-FPR = 10−3) are unrestricted
with semantically meaningful patterns. Bottom: Qualitative analysis on single-
attribute adversarial attack (G-FPR = 10−3). More results are shown in the
supplementary
It shows that our SemanticAdv can generate examples with reasonably-looking
appearance guided by the corresponding attribute. In particular, SemanticAdv
is able to generate perturbations on the corresponding regions correlated with
the augmented attribute, while the perturbations of CW have no specific pattern
and are evenly distributed across the image.
To further measure the perceptual quality of the adversarial images generated
by SemanticAdv in the most strict settings (G-FPR < 10−4), we conduct a
user study using Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT). In total, we collect 2, 620
annotations from 77 participants. In 39.14± 1.96% (close to random guess 50%)
of trials, the adversarial images generated by our SemanticAdv are selected as
reasonably-looking images, while 30.27± 1.96% of trials by CW are selected as
reasonably-looking. It indicates that SemanticAdv can generate more perceptu-
ally plausible adversarial examples compared with CW under the most strict
setting (G-FPR < 10−4). The corresponding images are shown in supplementary
materials.
SemanticAdv 11
Pa
le 
Sk
in
Ey
eg
las
se
s
Re
ce
din
g
Ha
irl
ine
Ro
sy
 C
he
ek
s
Bl
on
d 
Ha
ir
Ch
ub
by
Yo
un
g
Bu
sh
y E
ye
br
ow
s
W
av
y H
air
Sm
ilin
g
W
ea
rin
g
Lip
sti
ck
He
av
y M
ak
eu
p
Ba
gs
 U
nd
er
 E
ye
s
W
ea
rin
g
Ea
rri
ng
s
Ba
ng
s
Ar
ch
ed
 E
ye
br
ow
s
Mo
ut
h
Sli
gh
tly
 O
pe
n0
25
50
75
100
At
ta
ck
 S
uc
ce
ss
 R
at
e 
(%
) Res-101 (softmax loss)
Pa
le 
Sk
in
Ey
eg
las
se
s
Re
ce
din
g
Ha
irl
ine
Ro
sy
 C
he
ek
s
Bl
on
d 
Ha
ir
Ch
ub
by
Yo
un
g
Sm
ilin
g
W
av
y H
air
He
av
y M
as
k
Bu
sh
y E
ye
br
ow
s
Ba
gs
 U
nd
er
 E
ye
s
W
ea
rin
g
Lip
sti
ck
Ar
ch
ed
 E
ye
br
ow
s
W
ea
rri
ng
Ea
rri
ng
s
Ba
ng
s
Mo
ut
h
Sli
gh
tly
 O
pe
n0
25
50
75
100 Res-101 (cos loss)
Fig. 4: Quantitative analysis on the attack success rate with different single-
attribute attacks. In each figure, we show the results correspond to a larger FPR
(G-FPR = T-FPR = 10−3) in skyblue and the results correspond to a smaller
FPR (G-FPR = T-FPR = 10−4) in blue, respectively
Single attribute analysis. One of the key advantages of our SemanticAdv is that
we can generate adversarial perturbations in a more controllable fashion guided
by the selected semantic attribute. This allows analyzing the robustness of a
recognition system against different types of semantic attacks. We group the
adversarial examples by augmented attributes in various settings. In Figure 4,
we present the attack success rate against two face verification models, namely,
R-101-S and R-101-C, using different attributes. We highlight the bar with light
blue for G-FPR = 10−3 and blue for G-FPR = 10−4, respectively. As shown in
Figure 4, with a larger T-FPR = 10−3, our SemanticAdv can achieve almost
100% attack success rate across different attributes. With a smaller T-FPR =
10−4, we observe that SemanticAdv guided by some attributes such as Mouth
Slightly Open and Arched Eyebrows achieve less than 50% attack success rate,
while other attributes such as Pale Skin and Eyeglasses are relatively less
affected. In summary, the above experiments indicate that SemanticAdv guided
by attributes describing the local shape (e.g., mouth, earrings) achieve a relatively
lower attack success rate compared to attributes relevant to the color (e.g., hair
color) or entire face region (e.g., skin). This suggests that the face verification
models used in our experiments are more robustly trained in terms of detecting
local shapes compared to colors. In practice, we have the flexibility to select
attributes for attacking an image based on the perceptual quality and attack
success rate.
Transferability analysis. To generate adversarial examples under black-box setting,
we analyze the transferability of SemanticAdv in various settings. For each model
with different FPRs, we select the successfully attacked adversarial examples from
Section 4.1 to construct our evaluation dataset and evaluate these adversarial
samples across different models. Table 2(a) illustrates the transferability of
SemanticAdv among different models by using the same FPRs (G-FPR = T-FPR
= 10−3). Table 2(b) illustrates the result with different FPRs for generation
and evaluation (G-FPR = 10−4 and T-FPR = 10−3). As shown in Table 2(a),
adversarial examples generated against models trained with softmax loss exhibit
certain transferability compared to models trained with cosine loss. We conduct
the same experiment by generating adversarial examples with CW and found it
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Table 2: Transferability of SemanticAdv : cell (i, j) shows attack success rate of
adversarial examples generated against j-th model and evaluate on i-th model.
Results of CW are listed in brackets. Left: Results generated with G-FPR =
10−3 and T-FPR = 10−3; Right: Results generated with G-FPR = 10−4 and
T-FPR = 10−3
Mtest /Mopt R-50-S R-101-S R-50-C R-101-C
R-50-S 1.000 (1.000) 0.108 (0.032) 0.023 (0.007) 0.018 (0.005)
R-101-S 0.169 (0.029) 1.000 (1.000) 0.030 (0.009) 0.032 (0.011)
R-50-C 0.166 (0.054) 0.202 (0.079) 1.000 (1.000) 0.048 (0.020)
R-101-C 0.120 (0.034) 0.236 (0.080) 0.040 (0.017) 1.000 (1.000)
(a)
Mtest /Mopt R-50-S R-101-S
R-50-S 1.000 (1.000) 0.862 (0.530)
R-101-S 0.874 (0.422) 1.000 (1.000)
R-50-C 0.693 (0.347) 0.837 (0.579)
R-101-C 0.617 (0.218) 0.888 (0.617)
(b)
has weaker transferability compared to our SemanticAdv (results in brackets of
Table 2).
As Table 2(b) illustrates, the adversarial examples generated against the model
with smaller G-FPR = 10−4 exhibit strong attack success rate when evaluating
the model with larger T-FPR = 10−3. Especially, we found the adversarial
examples generated against R-101-S have the best attack performance on other
models. These findings motivate the analysis of the query-free black-box API
attack detailed in the following paragraph.
Query-free black-box API attack. In this experiment, we generate adversarial
examples against R-101-S with G-FPR = 10−3(κ = 1.24), G-FPR = 10−4(κ =
0.60), and G-FPR < 10−4(κ = 0.30), respectively. We evaluate our algorithm
on two industry level face verification APIs, namely, Face++ and AliYun. Since
attack transferability has never been explored in concurrent work that generates
semantic adversarial examples, we use Lp bounded pixel-wise methods (CW [10],
MI-FGSM[16], M-DI2-FGSM[73]) as our baselines. We also introduce a much
strong baseline by first performing attribute-conditioned image editing and
running CW attack on the editted images, which we refer as and StarGAN+CW.
Compared to CW, the latter two devise certain techniques to improve their
transferability. We adopt the ensemble version of MI-FGSM[16] following the
original paper. As shown in Table 3, our proposed SemanticAdv achieves a
much higher attack success rate than the baselines in both APIs under all FPR
thresholds (e.g., our adversarial examples generated with G-FPR < 10−4 achieves
67.69% attack success rate on Face++ platform with T-FPR = 10−3). In addition,
we found that lower G-FPR can achieve higher attack success rate on both APIs
within the same T-FPR (see our supplementary material for more details).
SemanticAdv against defense methods. We evaluate the strength of the pro-
posed attack by testing against five existing defense methods, namely, Feature
squeezing [74], Blurring [38], JPEG [17], AMI [66] and adversarial training [42].
Figure 5 illustrates SemanticAdv is more robust against the pixel-wise defense
methods comparing with CW. The same G-FPR and T-FPR are used for evalua-
tion. Both SemanticAdv and CW achieve a high attack success rate when T-FPR
= 10−3, while SemanticAdv marginally outperforms CW when T-FPR goes down
to 10−4. While defense methods have proven to be effective against CW attacks
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Table 3: Quantitative analysis on query-free black-box attack. We use ResNet-101
optimized with softmax loss for evaluation and report the attack success rate(%)
on two online face verification platforms. Note that for PGD-based attacks, we
adopt MI-FGSM ( = 8) in [16] and M-DI2-FGSM ( = 8) in [73], respectively.
For CW, StarGAN+CW and SemanticAdv , we generate adversarial samples with
G-FPR < 10−4
API name Face++ AliYun
Attacker / Metric T-FPR = 10−3 T-FPR = 10−4 T-FPR = 10−3 T-FPR = 10−4
CW [10] 37.24 20.41 18.00 9.50
StarGAN+CW 47.45 26.02 20.00 8.50
MI-FGSM [16] 53.89 30.57 29.50 17.50
M-DI2-FGSM [73] 56.12 33.67 30.00 18.00
SemanticAdv 67.69 48.21 36.50 19.50
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Fig. 5: Quantitative analysis on attacking several defense methods including
JPEG [17], Blurring [38], and Feature Squeezing [74]
on classifiers trained with ImageNet [36], our results indicate that these methods
are still vulnerable in the face verification system with small G-FPR.
We further evaluate SemanticAdv on attribute-based defense method AMI [66]
by constructing adversarial examples for the pretrained VGG-Face [53] in a
black-box manner. From adversarial examples generated by R-101-S, we use fc7
as the embedding and select the images with normalized L2 distance (to the
corresponding benign images) beyond the threshold defined previously. With the
benign and adversarial examples, we first extract attribute witnesses with our
aligned face images and then leverage them to build a attribute-steered model.
When misclassifying 10% benign inputs into adversarial images, it only correctly
identifies 8% adversarial images from SemanticAdv and 12% from CW.
Moreover, we evaluate SemanticAdv on existing adversarial training based
defense (the detailed setting is presented in supplementary materials). We find
that accuracy of adversarial training based defense method is 10% against the
adversarial examples generated by SemanticAdv , while is 46.7% against the
adversarial examples generated by PGD [42]. It indicates that existing adversarial
training based defense method is less effective against SemanticAdv , which further
demonstrates that our SemanticAdv identifies an unexplored research area beyond
previous Lp-based ones.
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Fig. 6: Qualitative results on attacking face landmark detection model
GT label maps
Pred label maps
Source Image Source Layout (prediction)
Synthesized Image with Augmented Layout (ɑ=0)
Adversarial Image by 
Optimization (ɑ=argminɑL(.))Source Layout 
(ground-truth)
Target Layout 
(ground-truth) Manipulated Image
Manipulated 
Layout (prediction)
Manipulated Layout 
(ground-truth)
Source Image Source Layout (prediction)
Source Layout 
(ground-truth)
Target Layout 
(ground-truth)
Synthesized Image with Augmented Layout (ɑ=0)
Manipulated Image
Manipulated 
Layout (prediction)
Manipulated Layout 
(ground-truth)
Task: pedestrian removal attack
Task: cyclist → pedestrian attack
Adversarial Image by 
Optimization (ɑ=argminɑL(.))
Fig. 7: Qualitative results on attacking street-view semantic segmentation model
4.3 SemanticAdv on Face Landmark Detection
We evaluate the effectiveness of SemanticAdv on face landmark detection under
two attack tasks, namely, “Rotating Eyes” and “Out of Region”. For the “Rotating
Eyes” task, we rotate the coordinates of the eyes in the image counter-clockwise
by 90◦. For the “Out of Region” task, we set a target bounding box and attempt
to push all points out of the box. Figure 6 indicates that our method is applicable
to attack landmark detection models.
4.4 SemanticAdv on Street-view Semantic Segmentation
We further demonstrate the applicability of our SemanticAdv beyond the face
domain by generating adversarial perturbations on street-view images. Figure 7
illustrates the adversarial examples on semantic segmentation. In the first example,
we select the leftmost pedestrian as the target object instance and insert another
car into the scene to attack it. The segmentation model has been successfully
attacked to neglect the pedestrian (see last column), while it does exist in the scene
(see second-to-last column). In the second example, we insert an adversarial car
in the scene by SemanticAdv and the cyclist has been recognized as a pedestrian
by the segmentation model.
5 Conclusions
Overall we presented a novel attack method SemanticAdv , which is capable of
generating semantically meaningful adversarial perturbations guided by single
semantic attribute. Compared to existing methods, SemanticAdv works in a more
controllable fashion. Experimental evaluations on face verification and landmark
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detection demonstrate several unique properties including attack transferability.
We believe this work would open up new research opportunities and challenges in
the field of adversarial learning. For instance, how to leverage semantic information
to defend against such attacks will lead to potential new discussions.
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A Implementation details
In this section, we provide implementation details used in our experiments. We
implement our SemanticAdv using PyTorch [54]. Our implementation will be
available after the final decision.
A.1 Face identity verification
We use Adam optimizer [33] to generate adversarial examples for both our
SemanticAdv and the pixel-wise attack method CW [10]. More specifically, we
run optimization for up to 200 steps with a fixed updating rate 0.05 under G-FPR
< 10−4. Under cases with a slightly higher G-FPR, we run the optimization for
up to 500 steps with a fixed updating rate 0.01. For the pixel-wise attack method
CW, we use additional pixel reconstruction objective with the weight set to 5.
Specifically, we run optimization for up to 1, 000 steps with a fixed updating rate
10−3.
Evaluation metrics. To evaluate the performance of SemanticAdv under different
attributes, we consider three metrics as follows:
– Best: the attack is successful as long as one single attribute among 17 can be
successfully attacked;
– Average: we calculate the average attack success rate among 17 attributes
for the same face identity;
– Worst: the attack is successful only when all of 17 attributes can be successfully
attacked;
Please note that we use the Best metric as a fair comparison to the attack success
rate reported by existing pixel-wise attack methods, while SemanticAdv can be
generated with different attributes as one of our advantages. In practice, both
our SemanticAdv (Best) and CW achieve 100% attack success rate. In addition,
we report the performance using the average and worst metric, which enables us
to analyze the adversarial robustness towards certain semantic attributes.
Pixel-wise defense methods. Feature squeezing [74] is a simple but effective
method by reducing color bit depth to remove the adversarial effects. We compress
the image represented by 8 bits for each channel to 4 bits for each channel to
evaluate the effectiveness. For Blurring [38], we use a 3×3 Gaussian kernel with
standard deviation 1 to smooth the adversarial perturbations. For JPEG [17], it
leverages the compression and decompression to remove the adversarial pertur-
bation. We set the compression ratio as 0.75 in our experiment.
A.2 Face landmark detection
We use Adam optimizer [33] to generate SemanticAdv against the face landmark
detection model. Specifically, we run optimization for up to 2, 000 steps with a
fixed updating rate 0.05 with the balancing factor λ set to 0.01 (see Eq. 3 in the
main paper).
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Evaluation Metrics. We apply different metrics for two adversarial attack tasks,
respectively. For “Rotating Eyes” task, we use a widely adopted metric Normalized
Mean Error (NME) [9] for experimental evaluation.
rNME =
1
N
N∑
k=1
||pk − pˆk||2√
WB ∗HB
, (7)
where pk denotes the k-th ground-truth landmark, pˆk denotes the k-th predicted
landmark and
√
WB ∗HB is the square-root area of ground-truth bounding box,
where WB and HB represents the width and height of the box.
For “Out of Region” task, we consider the attack is successful if the landmark
predictions fall outside a pre-defined centering region on the portrait image.
We introduce a metric that reflects the portion of landmarks outside of the
pre-defined centering region: rOR =
Nout
Ntotal
, where Nout denotes the number of
predicted landmarks outside the pre-defined bounding box and Ntotal denotes
the total number of landmarks.
A.3 Ablation study: feature-space interpolation
We include an ablation study on feature-space interpolation by analyzing attack
success rates using different feature-maps in the main paper. We illustrate the
choices of StarGAN feature-maps used in Figure 8. Table 1 in the main paper
shows the attack success rate on R-101-S. As shown in Figure 8, we use fi
to represent the feature-map after i-th up-sampling operation. f0 denotes the
feature-map before applying up-sampling operation. The result demonstrates that
samples generated by interpolating on f0 achieve the highest success rate. Since
f0 is the feature-map before decoder, it still well embeds semantic information in
the feature space. We adopt f0 for interpolation in our experiments.
128x112x112
256x56x56
512x28x28
f-2
f-1 f0 f1 f2
256x56x56
128x112x112
512x28x28
Visual Attribute
Original
Image
f-1 f0 f1 f2
Output
Image
512 * 282
256 * 562 128 * 1122
Fig. 8: The illustration of the features we used in StarGAN encoder-decoder
architecture.
B Additional quantitative results
B.1 Face identity verification
Benchmark performance. We provide additional information about the ResNet
models used in the experiments. Table 4 illustrates the performance on multiple
22 H. Qiu et al.
face identity verification benchmarks including Labeled Face in the Wild (LFW)
dataset [25], AgeDB-30 dataset [46], and Celebrities in Frontal-Profile (CFP)
dataset [60]. LFW [25] is the de facto standard testing set for face verification
under unconstrained conditions, which contains 13, 233 face images from 5, 749
identities. AgeDB [46] contains 12, 240 images from 440 identities. AgeDB-30 is
the most challenging subsets for evaluating face verification models. The large
variations in age makes the face model perform worse on this dataset than on
LFW. CFP [60] consists of 500 identities, where each identity has 10 frontal
and 4 profile images. Although good performance has been achieved on the
Frontal-to-Frontal (CFP-FF) test protocol, the Frontal-to-Profile (CFP-FP) test
protocol still remains challenging as most of the face training sets have very
few profile face images. Table 4 indicates that the used face verification model
achieves state-of-the-art under all benchmarks.
Table 4: The verification accuracy (%) of ResNet models on multiple face recog-
nition datasets including LFW, AgeDB-30, and CFP.
M / benchmarks LFW AgeDB-30 CFP-FF CFP-FP
R-50-S 99.27 94.15 99.26 91.49
R-101-S 99.42 95.93 99.57 95.07
R-50-C 99.38 95.08 99.24 90.24
R-101-C 99.67 95.58 99.57 92.71
Thresholds for identity verification. To decide whether two portrait images belong
to the same identity or not, we use the normalized L2 distance between face
features and set the FPR thresholds accordingly, which is a commonly used
procedure when evaluating the face verification model [35,32]. Table 5 illustrates
the threshold values used in our experiments when determining whether two
portrait images belong to the same identity or not.
Table 5: The threshold values for face identity verification.
FPR/M R-50-S R-101-S R-50-C R-101-C
10−3 1.181 1.244 1.447 1.469
3× 10−4 1.058 1.048 1.293 1.242
10−4 0.657 0.597 0.864 0.809
Quantitative analysis. Combining the results from Table 6 and Figure 4 in
the main paper, we understand that the face verification models used in our
experiments have different levels of robustness across attributes. For example,
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face verification models are more robust against local shape variations than
color variations, e.g., pale skin has higher attack success rate than mouth open.
We believe these discoveries will help the community further understand the
properties of face verification models.
Table 6 shows the overall performance (accuracy) of face verification model
and attack success rate of SemanticAdv and CW. As shown in Table 6, although
the face model trained with cos objective achieves higher face recognition per-
formance, it is more vulnerable to adversarial attack compared with the model
trained with softmax objective. Table 7 shows that the intermediate results of
SemanticAdv before adversarial perturbation cannot attack successfully, which in-
dicates the success of SemanticAdv comes from adding adversarial perturbations
through interpolation.
Table 6: Quantitative results of identity verification (%). It shows accuracy of
face verification model and attack success rate of SemanticAdv and CW.
G-FPR Metrics /M R-50-S R-101-S R-50-C R-101-C
10−3
Verification Accuracy 98.36 98.78 98.63 98.84
SemanticAdv (Best) 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
SemanticAdv (Worst) 91.95 93.98 99.53 99.77
SemanticAdv (Average) 98.98 99.29 99.97 99.99
CW 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
3× 10−4
Verification Accuracy 97.73 97.97 97.91 97.85
SemanticAdv (Best) 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
SemanticAdv (Worst) 83.75 79.06 98.98 96.64
SemanticAdv (Average) 97.72 97.35 99.92 99.72
CW 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
10−4
Verification Accuracy 93.25 92.80 93.43 92.98
SemanticAdv (Best) 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
SemanticAdv (Worst) 33.59 19.84 67.03 48.67
SemanticAdv (Average) 83.53 76.64 95.57 91.13
CW 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
B.2 Face landmark detection
We present the quantitative results of SemanticAdv on face landmark detection
model in Table 8 including two adversarial tasks, namely, “Rotating Eyes” and
“Out of Region”. We observe that our method is efficient to perform attacking
on landmark detection models. For certain attributes such as “Eyeglasses” and
“Pale Skin”, SemanticAdv achieves reasonably-good performance.
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Table 7: Attack success rate of the intermediate output of SemanticAdv (%).
x′, G(x′, c) and G(x′, cnew) are the intermediate results of our method before
adversarial perturbation.
G-FPR Metrics /M R-50-S R-101-S R-50-C R-101-C
10−3
x′ 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00
G(x′, c) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.23
G(x′, cnew)(Best) 0.16 0.08 0.16 0.31
3× 10−4
x′ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
G(x′, c) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
G(x′, cnew)(Best) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
10−4
x′ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
G(x′, c) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
G(x′, cnew)(Best) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 8: Quantitative results on face landmark detection (%) The two row shows
the measured ratios (lower is better) for “Rotating Eyes” and “Out of Region”
task, respectively.
Tasks (Metrics) Pristine
Augmented Attributes
Blond
Hair
Young Eyeglasses
Rosy
Cheeks
Smiling
Arched
Eyebrows
Bangs
Pale
Skin
rNME ↓ 28.04 14.03 17.28 8.58 13.24 19.21 23.42 15.99 10.72
rOR ↓ 45.98 17.42 23.04 7.51 16.65 25.44 33.85 20.03 13.51
B.3 User study
We conduct a user study on the adversarial images of SemanticAdv and CW
used in the experiment of API-attack and the original images. The adversarial
images are generated with G-FPR< 10−4 for both methods. We present a pair
of original image and adversarial image to participants and ask them to rank the
two options. The order of these two images is randomized and the images are
displayed for 2 seconds in the screen during each trial. After the images disappear,
the participants have unlimited time to select the more reasonably-looking image
according to their perception. To maintain the high quality of the collected
responses, each participant can only conduct at most 50 trials, while and each
adversarial image was shown to 5 different participants. We present the images
we used for user study in Figure 9. In total, we collect 2, 620 annotations from
77 participants. In 39.14± 1.96% of trials the adversarial images generated by
SemanticAdv are selected as reasonably-looking images and in 30.27± 1.96% of
trails, the adversarial images generated by CW are selected as reasonably-looking
images. It indicates that our semantic adversarial examples are more perceptual
reasonably-looking than CW. Additionally, we also conduct the user study with
larger G-FPR= 10−3. In 45.42± 1.96% of trials, the adversarial images generated
SemanticAdv 25
Table 9: Transferability of SemanticAdv : cell (i, j) shows attack success rate of
adversarial examples generated against j-th model and evaluate on i-th model.
Results are generated with G-FPR = 10−4 and T-FPR = 10−4.
Mtest /Mopt R-50-S R-101-S R-50-C R-101-C
R-50-S 1.000 0.005 0.000 0.000
R-101-S 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000
R-50-C 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
R-101-C 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
by SemanticAdv are selected as reasonably-looking images, which is very close to
the random guess (50%).
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Fig. 9: Qualitative comparisons among ground truth, pixel-wise adversarial ex-
amples generated by CW, and our proposed SemanticAdv . Here, we present the
results from G-FPR < 10−4 so that perturbations are visible.
B.4 Semantic attack transferability
In Table 9, we present the quantitative results of the attack transferability under
the setting with G-FPR = 10−4 and T-FPR = 10−4. We observe that with more
strict testing criterion (lower T-FPR) of the verification model, the transferability
becomes lower across different models.
To further showcase that our SemanticAdv is non-trivially different from pixel-
wise attack added on top of semantic image editing, we provide one additional
baseline called StarGAN+CW and evaluate its attack transferability. This baseline
first performs semantic image editing using the StarGAN model (non-adversarial)
and then conducts the standard Lp CW attacks on the generated images. As
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Table 10: Transferability of StarGAN+CW : cell (i, j) shows attack success rate
of adversarial examples generated against j-th model and evaluate on i-th model.
Results of SemanticAdv are listed in brackets.
Mtest /Mopt R-101-S
R-50-S 0.035 (0.108)
R-101-S 1.000 (1.000)
R-50-C 0.145 (0.202)
R-101-C 0.085 (0.236)
(a) G-FPR=10−3, T-FPR=10−3
Mtest /Mopt R-101-S
R-50-S 0.615 (0.862)
R-101-S 1.000 (1.000)
R-50-C 0.570 (0.837)
R-101-C 0.695 (0.888)
(b) G-FPR=10−4, T-FPR=10−3
shown in Table 10, the StarGAN+CW baseline has noticeable performance gap
to our proposed SemanticAdv . This also justifies that our SemanticAdv is able to
produce novel adversarial examples which cannot be simply achieved by combining
attribute-conditioned image editing model with Lp bounded perturbation.
B.5 Query-free black-box API attack
Fig. 10: Illustration of our SemanticAdv in the real world face verification platform
(editing on pale skin). Note that the confidence denotes the likelihood that two
faces belong to the same person.
In Table 11, we present the results of SemanticAdv performing query-free black-
box attack on three online face verification platforms. SemanticAdv outperforms
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Table 11: Quantitative analysis on query-free black-box attack. We use ResNet-101
optimized with softmax loss for evaluation and report the attack success rate(%).
Note that for Micresoft Azure API, it does not provide the accept thresholds
for different T-FPRs and thus we use the provided likelihood 0.5 to determine
whether two faces belong to the same person.
API name Face++ AliYun Azure
Metric T-FPR T-FPR Likelihood
Attacker / Metric value 10−3 10−4 10−3 10−4 0.5
Original x 2.04 0.51 0.50 0.00 0.00
Generated xnew 4.21 0.53 0.50 0.00 0.00
CW (G-FPR = 10−3) 9.18 2.04 2.00 0.50 0.00
StarGAN+CW (G-FPR = 10−3) 15.9 3.08 3.50 1.00 0.00
SemanticAdv (G-FPR = 10−3) 20.00 4.10 4.00 0.50 0.00
CW (G-FPR = 10−4) 28.57 10.17 10.50 2.50 1.04
StarGAN+CW (G-FPR = 10−4) 35.38 14.36 12.50 3.50 1.05
SemanticAdv (G-FPR = 10−4) 58.25 31.44 24.00 10.50 5.73
CW 37.24 20.41 18.00 9.50 3.09
StarGAN+CW 47.45 26.02 20.00 8.50 5.56
MI-FGSM [16] 53.89 30.57 29.50 17.50 10.82
M-DI2-FGSM [73] 56.12 33.67 30.00 18.00 12.04
SemanticAdv (G-FPR < 10−4) 67.69 48.21 36.5 19.5 15.63
CW and StarGAN+CW in all APIs under all FPR thresholds. In addition,
under the same T-FPR, we achieve higher attack success rate on APIs using
samples generated using lower G-FPR compared to samples generated using
higher G-FPR. Original x and generated xnew are regarded as reference point of
the performance of online face verification platforms. In Figure 10, we also show
several examples of our API attack on Microsoft Azure face verification system,
which further demonstrates the effectiveness of our approach.
B.6 SemanticAdv against adversarial training
We evaluate our SemanticAdv against the existing adversarial training based
defense method [42]. In detail, we randomly sample 10 persons from CelebA [40]
and then randomly split the sampled dataset into training set, validation set and
testing set according to a proportion of 80%, 10% and 10%, respectively. We
train a ResNet-50 [23] to identify these face images by following the standard face
recognition training pipeline [63]. As CelebA [40] does not contain enough images
for each person, we finetune our model from a pretrained model trained on MS-
Celeb-1M [22,80]. We train the robust model by using adversarial training based
method [42]. In detail, we follow the same setting in [42]. We use 7-step PGD
L∞ attack to generate adversarial examples to solve the inner maximum problem
for adversarial training. During test process, we evaluate by using adversarial
examples generated by 20-step PGD attacks. The perturbation is bounded by 8
pixel (ranging from [0,255]) in terms of L∞ distance).
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Table 12: Accuracy on standard model (without adversarial training) and robust
model (with adversarial training).
Training Method / Attack Benign PGD SemanticAdv
Standard 93.3% 0% 0%
Robust [42] 86.7% 46.7% 10%
As shown in Table 12, the robust model achieves 10% accuracy against
the adversarial examples generated by SemanticAdv , while 46.7% against the
adversarial examples generated by PGD [42]. It indicates that existing adversarial
training based defense method is less effective against SemanticAdv . It further
demonstrates that our SemanticAdv identifies an unexplored research area beyond
previous Lp-based ones.
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C Additional visualizations
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1.0, 1.0, 0.0, 1.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 
0.0, 0.0]
young, mouth slightly open, bushy
eyebrows, smiling
134: [1.0, 0.0, 1.0, 0.0, 1.0, 1.0, 0.0, 
0.0, 0.0, 1.0, 1.0, 1.0, 0.0, 1.0, 0.0, 
0.0, 0.0]
blond hair, young, heavy makeup, 
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Fig. 11: Qualitative analysis on single-attribute adversarial attack (G-FPR=10−3).
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132: [0.0, 0.0, 1.0, 0.0, 1.0, 0.0, 0.0, 
1.0, 0.0, 1.0, 1.0, 1.0, 0.0, 1.0, 1.0, 
0.0, 0.0]
young, heavy makeup, mouth 
slightly open, wearing lipstick, 
smiling, arched eyebrows, wearing 
earrings, bags under eyes
189: [0.0, 0.0, 1.0, 0.0, 1.0, 0.0, 0.0, 
1.0, 0.0, 1.0, 0.0, 1.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 
0.0, 0.0]
young, heavy makeup, mouth 
slightly open, wearing lipstick, 
arched eyebrows
Fig. 12: Qualitative analysis on single-attribute adversarial attack (G-FPR=10−3).
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Fig. 13: Qualitative analysis on single-attribute adversarial attack (G-FPR=10−3).
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Semantic Adversarial Examples
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Fig. 14: Qualitative comparisons between our proposed SemanticAdv (G-FPR
= 10−3) and pixel-wise adversarial examples generated by CW. Along with the
adversarial examples, we also provide the corresponding perturbations (residual)
on the right.
SemanticAdv 33
Fig. 15: Qualitative analysis on single-attribute adversarial attack (SemanticAdv
with G-FPR = 10−3) by each other. Along with the adversarial examples, we
also provide the corresponding perturbations (residual) on the right.
